Communism doesn’t work because people like to own stuff.
– Frank Zappa, American composer and musician
On February 6, 1972, the federal government published a White Paper entitled ‘The Threat of Armed Communism in Sarawak’.
Sarawak had reached the crossroads of its political journey as Malaysia was fighting two wars — against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and NKCP.
In the paper, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs Tun Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman said that after Confrontation ended in August 1966, the Sarawak communists ‘accelerated’ their armed insurgency plans.
Supt R. Thambipillay in ‘God’s Little Acre’ (1948-1998) said: “The fury of the CTs was aimed not just at the European managerial staff of mines and plantations, but also the mainly faithful office staff and labour force who were so vulnerable.
“The CTs particularly concentrated on the Chinese who refused to back them or the running dogs who worked with the government. From June to October 1948, almost all the 223 civilians they killed were Chinese and only 17 were Europeans. Nor should it be forgotten that over 70 percent of the security forces (in Malaya) killed were police, mainly Malays.”
During the 12-year-long Malayan Emergency between June 1948 and July 31, 1960, 450 new villages were created and about 470,000 people — 400,000 of whom were Chinese — were interned in the resettlement programme.
Called the Briggs Plan, it was devised by British General Sir Harold Briggs in 1950 as director of operations during the Malayan Emergency and aimed at defeating the Malayan communist guerrillas by cutting them off from their sources of support, a similar plan was later established in the Siburan enclave after the killing of Sgt Simon Ningkan in 1965.
RASCOM was the brainchild of Taiping-born former communist Yuen Yuet Leng who was invited to Kuching to draw up a strategy to defeat the terrorists in late 1971. The plan was to “isolate the enemy from the support bases” (20,000 sympathisers) by cutting off medical and food supplies and other facilities that the terrorists required.
A Sarawak Communist Organisation (SCO) manual read: “We must have the resolution and courage to persist in the struggle … in order to increase our weapons and fighting ability.
“We are still not capable of eliminating the enemy in large numbers. So, we must ambush the enemy — this is to be our form of attack. It is only through a long-term struggle that we can gradually expand our strength.”
In a special report by anti-terrorist expert ACP Thoo Kim Nyian, he said that the CTs launched a reign of terror after 1970 where at least 77 policemen and civilians were killed in in the Rajang Basin alone (Sibu, Sarikei and Kanowit).
Said Thoo: “The victims included SB officer Inspector Hermon Wong, election staff, Border Scouts, policemen, RELA members, as well as civilians and former CTs who were accused as being ‘spies’ or informers of the SB.”
To counter the terrorists Yuen launched ‘Operation Ngayau’ named after an ancient Iban headhunting mission.
In an interview with Yuen he told me: “I had to do the job in Sarawak to contain the communists. Tun Razak (the prime minister) had already decided that we could not afford to fight two serious communist threats — one in Semenanjung (Peninsular Malaysia) and one in Sarawak.
“I was told that I had to go and clear up what seemed to be the lesser threat in Sarawak, but if not contained immediately, would grow into a big one. And you would never be able to manage the threat inside.”
Operation Ngayau broke the backbone of the SCO which is now a splintered force — one under NKCP’s secretary general Bong Kee Chok whose army was in Kuching and Sri Aman Divisions, and the other Sibu Division commander Hung Chu Ting.
After several months of establishment, RASCOM had gathered enough information to take on the CTs.
“The periodical cordon, search and arrest operations brought forth coverage in most of the inaccessible areas. By the end of 1972, the better coverage in the Lower Rajang area was maintained with increased arrests at more points.
“Coverage on the OMT (Oya Mukah Tatau group) CTs along the Rajang River improved tremendously in numbers, quality and speedy reporting in direct or indirect manner. Within the more remote mid-Rajang CT areas, especially, the Special Branch (SB) presence was felt more as organised patrols moved frequently to native population points.”
He said that the success in gathering intelligence was due to a collective effort including numerous ‘listening posts’ and debriefing operational reports by military intelligence officers (MIOs).
Between January and June 1973, RASCOM launched ‘Operation Sadit’, which resulted in the elimination of 13 top CTs, including some leaders belonging to the OMT, Middle Rajang and Lower Rajang Armed Work 12.
Yuen in his report ‘The Intelligence in RASCOM’ (October 13, 1990) said that by channelling the CTs into areas of our own choosing we would be able to corner and eliminate them.
“The intention was to break the NKCP stranglehold on the terrorised population and in the process to eliminate as many terrorists as possible by way of kills and better still, captures, surrenders or deserters who could produce more recent tactical and deeper organisational intelligence.
“In essence, Ngayau was RASCOM’s preparatory phase for intelligence when a selected team from KL (the special Malayan police squad called Vat 69 led by Datuk Leong Chee Woh) was posted to Kuching.
Between January and June 1973, RASCOM launched ‘Operation Sadit’, which resulted in the elimination of 13 top CTs, including some leaders belonging to the OMT, Middle Rajang and Lower Rajang Armed Work.
By the time the Sri Aman accord signed in October 21, 1973 the police had killed a total of 173 members of the AWF 18 from the Sibu Town Committee, 36 from the Middle Rajang AWF, 38 from the OMT AWF, and 81 from the Lower Rajang AWF.
The views expressed here are those of the columnist and do not necessarily represent the views of New Sarawak Tribune.
