The loopholes in the anti-hopping law

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In law, a man is guilty when he violates the rights of others. In ethics, he is guilty if he only thinks of doing so. 

Immanuel Kant, German philosopher

It was providence and good fortune that save the four rogue opposition Members of Parliament who pledged their support for Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim from having to vacate their seats. 

Indeed, Labuan MP Datuk Suhaili Abdul Rahman should know what he was talking about. He was on the dot when he stated that the loophole in the anti-hopping law (AHL) that allows lawmakers to retain their seat if they switch allegiances without quitting their party was providence.

He also argued that he could not be blamed for the existence of the loophole as he had not been a lawmaker when the constitutional amendment was drafted and eventually approved in Parliament.

“I did not read the law thoroughly, but what I know is if we quit the party, we will have to vacate the seat. But I did not quit the party. I had just declared support for the unity government and I got the allocation,” he said, referring to the funding for all government-aligned MPs.

“If fate had destined to be a loophole, then it would be our good fortune (rezeki),” said Suhaili when speaking to reporters at the Parti Gagasan Rakyat Sabah annual congress in Kota Kinabalu on Nov 13.

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The Labuan MP has been suspended from Parti Bersatu for declaring his support for the government.

So, what are the loopholes in the AHL which took effect on Oct 5 last year, five days before it was announced that the country’s Parliament would be dissolved to pave the way for the 15th general election. 

Enshrined in Constitutional (Amendment) (No. 3) Act 2022, the AHL provisions usher in a healthier direction in Malaysian politics. It seeks to condemn the betrayal of the trust of the electorate as seen in the 2020 Sheraton Move, where a number of MPs defected from the ruling Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition, thus triggering its demise. 

The AHL still has a fundamental problem in the sense that it has the implication of producing rubber-stamp legislatures. For instance, amendments such as that made by the DAP negates the escape clause in the constitutional amendment, the AHL can be used as a disciplinary tool to stifle party dissent.

The whip system in Malaysia is quite effective in that there will be minimal chance of backbench revolts that interfere with the dominance of the ruling government.

A major loophole that can be exploited is that anti party-hopping provisions cannot be invoked when a political party joins a coalition or leaves a coalition to join another. 

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In practical context, there is no legal provision barring a PH component party to contest in an election with PH, with the PH manifesto and even PH logo on the ballot sheet. 

After the election, the party can defect from PH and join a BN-led government, and all the MPs in its ranks will get to hold on to their seats. 

The AHL considers such coalition realignments to be reasonable and permissible, but to informed observers, such a state of affairs is unpalatable as it violates electoral outcomes.

According to Professor Wong Chin Huat, the problem we should tackle is not party-hopping, or what forms it takes, but its root causes. 

I agree with Wong that in Malaysia, party-hopping is more often than not caused by corruption or personal ambition, as lawmakers crave ministerial or GLC jobs, lucrative projects or patronage for constituents.

We cannot eliminate political corruption (the root cause) by stopping party-hopping (the symptom) by threatening by-election (the deterrence).

Wong noted that the Achille’s heel of the anti-hopping law is this: by-elections may not be a deterrence to party-hoppers. If their voters see party-hopping as a means to get more patronage, the defectors can easily be re-elected.

Wong offered three solutions to end party hopping? 

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First, end the systematic discrimination against opposition lawmakers, most tellingly, in constituency allocation. All those who can’t wait to condemn the anti-hopping law, please support the call for Equitable Constituency Development Fund laws for Parliament and all 13 state assemblies.

Second, strengthen parties, not by strengthening party leaders’ control on lawmakers, but by strengthening ‘product differentiation’ between parties, by encouraging policy competition in strengthened Parliament and state assemblies.

If voters can see the difference between parties, and are therefore willing to penalise turncoats who sell their mandate, most turncoat wannabees would think twice.

Third, allow voters to directly vote for a party, namely, introducing Closed List Proportional Representation seats alongside the existent first-past-the-post seats, for which we vote for individual candidates. For party-list seats, the seats belong to the party.

If a party-list MP jumps ship, the seat would be vacated and immediately filled up by the next available candidate on the same list. No by-election is needed and voters don’t get to endorse party-hopping with their votes.

I concur with Wong’s suggestions and I believe that the government should consider them to plug loopholes in the anti-hopping law. 

The views expressed here are those of the columnist and do not necessarily represent the views of New Sarawak Tribune.  

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